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A problem which has developed into one of considerable importance
and interest is that of accounting for the improvement or upgrading of
reliability through corrective action on an item or system. This problem
arises in the development stage when failures are relatively frequent and
various failure modes, observed through design inspection or testing,
can be removed. Whether corrective action takes place through design
changes or development modifications, it is common to assume that the
action never decreases reliability and, at least occasionally, actually
increases reliability, hence the term reliability growth. Generally
speaking, the mathematical models developed for this problem concern
two objectives: (1) the prediction, before testing is initiated, of the
reliability that should be attained at various stages of development; and
(2) the estimation of reliability as a function of one or more parameters
from test data. In general, the latter objective is attained by making
statistical inferences from observed test data, while the former is
gained through the use of probabilistic models using certain assumptions
concerning the failure modes and the repair policy.
This paper concerns the exposition, in a uniform setting, of several
prediction models appearing in the literature and incorporation of some
general features into them, We therefore begin with a brief review of
these models.

Lloyd and Lipow [2] consider a system assumed to contain a
single failure mode. A testing program is carried out for the purpose
of discovering and removing the failure mode. On each trial, the
system fails with (known) probability q (i. e. , the system has reli-
ability 1 - q ) if the failure mode has not been corrected; otherwise,
it has reliability 1 . On each trial resulting in a failure, an attempt
is made to permanently repair the failure mode. It is assumed that
on each such attempt the probability of succeeding is known.
Thus, in the model of Lloyd and Lipow, the system is either in an
unrepaired state or a repaired state after n tests have been performed,
Using a difference equation for the probability that the device is in the
unrepaired state after n tests, Lloyd and Lipow show that the reliability
of the system for the n + 1 st test is 1 - q ( 1 - q0 )
Pollock [3] considers a similar system, in which the repair
probability is known, but the failure rate q of the "repaired"
system is not necessarily zero (nor even less than q) . Under various
assumptions concerning the distribution of failure occurrences (such as
Poisson or Bernoulli) and whether q and q are known or have some
known prior distribution, Pollock obtains the failure rate distributions
at time t (in the continuous case) and the density of the failure proba-
bility at the n + 1 st trial (in the discrete case) .
Weiss [5] considers a system possibly containing several failure
modes, each with the same exponential failure distribution. It is assumed
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that the failure modes present in the system are drawn from a popula-
tion of potential failure modes. This allows some relief from the
rather strict assumption that all failure modes have identically the
same failure rate, in that a higher failure rate for a mode can be mod-
eled roughly by a higher probability of the presence of that mode in the
system. The mean time to failure of the system is increased through
removal of observed failure modes.
Finally, Wolman [6] considers a system in which failures are of
two types, which we shall call "inherent" and "assignable cause" fol-
lowing the terminology of Barlow and Scheuer [ 1] . Each trial may
result in exactly one of the following: success, inherent failure, or
assignable cause failure. It is assumed that the system originally
contains k assignable cause failure modes, and once failure of such a
mode is observed the mode is permanently repaired. On each trial,
the remaining assignable cause failure modes each occur with known
probability q. Under certain "independence" assumptions, Wolman
shows how a Markov chain model can be used to obtain the reliability
of the system after n trials have been made.
The consideration of several assignable cause modes in the system
makes it important to distinguish carefully between the observation of a
failure and the repair of a mode. This is of importance, for example,
in consistently modeling independence of failure modes. It is also of
interest to consider various "repair policies" and their effect upon
system reliability after n trials.
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In what follows, we consider models encompassing the various
features mentioned above. Since the computational difficulty in a
particular application may be substantial, some effort is directed
toward establishing several methods that can be used for finding the
(predicted) reliability of the system after n trials. It should be kept
in mind that, throughout the paper, the problem being considered is
that of predicting, before testing is undertaken, what the reliability
of the system will be after n trials or, from another point of view,
predicting the number of trials required to attain a given reliability.
Because of its simplicity, we begin with a discussion of a system with
a single assignable cause mode, Lloyd and Lipow's model being a
particular example (model I) . We then extend to a system with k
assignable cause modes, assumed to be "equally likely" (model II)
.
Finally, a system with k non-equally likely modes is considered
(model III)
.
The following notation conventions were found to be useful.
(a) Empty sums (that is, summations in which the upper limit
on the index is smaller than the lower limit) are taken to be zero.
(b) Empty products are taken to be one.
(c) In some conditional probability statements involving the out-
come of a test, given a condition just prior to the test, no specific
mention of this "timing" is made. Thus, for example, P (E j E)
might; denote the conditional probability that the system is in state E
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immediately after a trial, given that it is in state E just prior to the
trial. The context should make the meaning of such symbols clear.

2. Model I: A Single Assignable Cause Mode
Suppose the system under consideration contains two "failure
modes", one associated with inherent failures and the other associated
with assignable cause failures. (The "inherent failure mode" is im-
agined to exist for ease of exposition. In particular, it may be taken
to be that part of the system other than the assignable cause failure
mode. ) Assume that on each trial the probability of an inherent
failure is q , and if the system is unrepaired and an inherent failure
does not occur, the probability of an assignable cause failure is q ;
otherwise, the probability of an assignable cause failure is zero. If
fVi
we let I denote the event "an inherent failure on the n trial",
n
A denote the event "an assignable cause failure on the n L trial",
n 5
th
and if we say that the system is in state for the n trial if it is
unrepaired after n - 1 trials (denoted by " E. , ,! ) , while if re-r • 0,11-1
paired after n - 1 trials the system is in state 1 for the n trial
(denoted by "E "), the above assumptions can be stated for-
mally as follows:
for n = 1 , 2 , 3 , ... ,
P[I,flA ] =P[I|E ]u n n n ' 1 , n - 1 -
P [ l I E n i ] = %u n ' , n - 1 "
[ I PI A ] = P [A I E. . ] =L n n J l n ! 1 , n - 1 J
P [ A I I PI E
,
] = qL n ! n , n - 1 d
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It follows that the conditional probability of an assignable cause failure
on the n trial, given the system is in state , is
L n I , n - 1 J
v M M
Before considering a more general repair policy, we digress some-
what to consider the relatively simple repair policy of Lloyd and Lipow;
namely, the system is repaired at (i. e. , immediately after) the n'
trial with probability if an assignable cause failure occurs at the
f-u
n trial; otherwise, it is repaired with probability zero . (This
corresponds to the repair policy in which an attempt is made to re-
pair the assignable cause failure mode each time it is observed to
fail, these attempts being "identical". )
Since the reliability of the system after n trials, R , is given
in this case by
1R=EP[I.nA Ll |E. ] • P (E. )n . . L n+1 n+ 1 ! i,n J i,n
= p [T _ n A . |E n ] • P (E. )L n+1 n+ 1 ' 0,n J v , n'
+ (1-P[I Ll U A ,,|E. ]) * P (E )L n+ 1 n+ 1 • 1 , n J , n
= d-q ) d-q) P(EQ>n ) + (1 -qQ ) (1 -F^n 11
(1 - qQ )
(1 - q P (E0> n ) ) (1)
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it is of interest to determine P (E ) for n = 1 , 2 , . . . . Lloyd
and Lipow solve essentially the same problem by considering a differ-
ence equation for P (E ) . An alternative is as follows. The one-
, n
step transition probability matrix (p.. ) for this process is easily
seen to be




- P [ E. IE. ]
ij J , n+ 1 l l, n
that is, p.. is the probability that the system goes from state i to
state j in one trial. The n-step transition probability matrix
<pi?V< , >
n
is thus given by
( Pij ) -
(1 - g0)
n
1 - (1 - g0)
n
where
g = ( 1 - q ) q
8 -

This is easily established by observing that each main diagonal ele-
ment in the product of the two upper triangular matrices is the product
of the corresponding main diagonal elements from these matrices and
that a product of stochastic matrices is stochastic. If the process







) = (P(E. ) , 1 - P(E




= V -8 0>n
Substituting this in (1) yields the predicted reliability of the system
after n trials,




Note that this reliability is conveniently expressed in a matrix product
form by
( ] - q ) (1 - q)





l 1 - P =
results in the expression for R derived by Lloyd and Lipow.
A more general repair policy that might be of interest in the
present model is as follows. Suppose the probability that the assign













, n - 1 J
v 0, n- 1
+ P [ A I E,
, ] • P (E rtL n I , n - i J , n - 1
n
, n- 1
,th£ [ u assignable cause failure
u=l
at nth trial I E ft , ]
!
, n - 1.
• (1 - b
u
) + (1 - g) j
Now
thP r u assignable cause failure at n trial I E^ . "1L 6 i
, n - 1 J
= P [ u - 1 assignable cause failures in n - 1 trial;
& A
I
E A 1 ]n ' . n - 1
n-l\ u - 1 . . n - u




(^;)gu (i- g ) n - u ( i-bu ) ; ». i, 2,
n





P(E0,n> " P <E0,n-l» [=n + ( ' " «> 3
where P (E ) = p the probability the system starts in state C .
It follows that
n
P (E ) = R n (s. + (1 - g) ) ; n = 0,1,2,...
,
n ° j=l J
Thus, by (1) ,
n
R = (1 - q ) (1 - q P n (s + (1 - (1 - q )q) ) ; n - 0, 1,2,, .. (4)
j=l J
As an example, note that in the case where b =
, (4) reduces
u
to the expression given in (2) , as should be the case. Suppose, for
th
another example, that a repair attempt is made only after the j
assignable cause failure, with probability b of a successful repair.
Then R is given by (4) , where b =0 for u / j , b. - b . In this
n ° u j
case, s = g for n< j and s = g(l -b ^ . jg w (l-g)
J









i - b Cj:i) gJ(1 - g) J
for n ^ j . Thus, for example, when n ^ j ,
R
n
d-q )(i-qe n [i-b(
j
k






3. Model II: k Equally Likely Assignable Cause Modes
We now consider the basic model of Wolman [6] in a setting
similar to that of Model I in the preceding section, together with
some alternatives and generalizations concerning repair policies,
initial states of the system, and methods of computing R . It is
hoped that the present approach clarifies the role of Wolman's
"independence" assumptions and corrects several typographical
errors in a discussion of Wolman's paper by George Weiss [4] .
Suppose the system under consideration is composed of k
assignable cause failure modes (hereafter called "type II" modes]
and an inherent failure mode (called a "type I" mode), with a
series hookup as depicted in Figure 1 .
failure
probability




Suppose "I " denotes, as before, the event that an inherent
n
failure occurs on the n**1 trial, while "A " denotes the event that
n
at least one assignable cause failure occurs on the n*"-n trial. We










P[I ] = P[I A ] = qnn n n
(the inherent failure probability is constant),
2. If the j th type LI mode is unrepaired prior to the nt" trial,
P [j"h II fails I I ] = ,
1 n
P [ j th II fails | I ] = q = 1 - p
(assignable cause failures in unrepaired type II modes are
equally likely and may occur only if an inherent failure does
not occur).
3. The type II modes are independent in the sense that given
that there are several type II modes which are unrepaired
prior to a trial and given that an inherent failure does not
occur on the trial, the probability that these type II modes
all fail on the trial is the product of the corresponding
probabilities q .
We say that the system is in state i(i= C, 1 , ...,k) for the
n*" trial if i type II modes have been (permanently) repaired after
n - 1 trials. Let "E ] denote the event that the system is in
i , n - 1
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state i, assumption (3) above implies that on the n"1 trial
k - ip[ a e n i 3 = Pn ' 1
,
n - 1 n J
Let us first consider the repair policy which leads to Wolman's
model.
If, on a given trial, at least one type II mode fails, exactly
one type II mode is repaired.
Under this repair policy, it is relatively straightforward to
compute R by any one of several approaches. These approaches
have in common a consideration of the transition probabilities of
the system. The k + 1 x k + 1 matrix of one-step transition proba-
bilities has a simple form in the present case. In fact, on any trial,
for i = 0,l,2,...,k,
p.
(1)
- P [E. IE. . ] = P [ A I E. ]
*ii L l , n ' l , n - 1 J L n 1 l , n - 1 J
= P [ A E. , n I ] • P [ I 3L n ! l , n - 1 n w u n J
+ p r a I e.
,
n I ] • P [ I 1L n'i,n-1 n J u n J
P
k




- P [E. IE. . 3 = P [ A I E. ]
*i t x + 1 L x + 1 , n ' x, n - 1 J
L n' i,n-l J
- 1 - Pii
(1)














q +(i-q )p (i-q )(i-P ) . . o
V (1 ' qo )pk ~ ( 1 -q )(1 "pk_2)
.
If 6 = ( P^ , 3 n , B_ , . . . i 3, ) is the distribution of initial states of
1 Z k
the system, that is, if
3. = P [ system starts in state i] ; i = , 1 ; , „ . , k
/ _ \
then 3 (p.. ) is the distribution of states occupied by the system
after n trials. The matrix form (3) of the reliability given in (1) is
easily extended to the present case, so that the reliability after n
trials is given by






(1 -qQ ) (7)
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The determination of (p.. ) is not as simple in the present
case as it was for Model I. Wolman considers an approach based upon
(1)
a "spectral decomposition" of (p,. ' ) , as follows: the characteristic






+ (1 - qQ ) p
;i=0,l,...,k
Thus, if X is a k + 1 X k.+ 1 matrix whose rows are linearly inde-




) = X~ * A
n X ; n = 1 , 2, . . .
Thus, once X and X have been determined (possibly more than a




An alternate approach to the determination of (p.. ) has been
suggested by Weiss [ 4] , In this approach, the elements in each row
of (p. ) are computed through the use of certain generating functions,
17

We illustrate this method for the ow of if p ': .
G
n
.(e) - £ sn p ; ' ; se(0 ( l),i = 0,l k01
n=0
Ci
(ti) 1 1 ) n



















(n) (n - 1) (1) (n-1) (1)
_
P 0i " P0,i-1 ' Pi-1, i + P 0:l P xi l,2,...,k (8)
Thus,
n , ,
" n r (n - 1) (1) (n-1) (1) -|G-.(s) - L s p . p. . + p p..
n=0
(1) ~ n (V< " n (n)
= P i~ l,i S * S PC,i-l + ' * * * P C:
n=0 n=0
(1) H)















i-1 , i , i-










Pi-zV:-! G0,i-2< 8 >
(1)
1 - p. . el-l
,
i-I





















































= ( s " Pj-i i
)
n=0 j=l J J ^












- p..' ' ) m-0
11 JJ
£ (p . s)
By comparing coefficients of the corresponding powers of s in this











P ~ P--mm jj
n
tfm
for n < i
for n s i
The other rows of (p.. ) are similarly determined, and R is
ij n
computed by (7) .
An alternate approach under the present repair policy that might
be of some interest is as follows: note that for fixed n (n - , 1 , 2
,
and i (i = 9 1 , . . . , k)
p.
(n|. ; J = o, i. , k
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is a mass function, since (p.." ) is a stocha matrix. Let




- (1 -q »M Plj ')









(n) k- j k (n) / 1 \j
* p oj p p * P 0j CT )
T
(n>
k _ /* , 1 . \





I ,,|t) = E|t ) ; t « ( , 1 ]
J
(n)
is the probability generating function of the random variable J







be obtained using the one-step transition probabilities given in (5)





1 r (-m ) r /, v k
(- + « w » '['JrOo* (1 " qo ,p JJ
o
(m ^ r /i v /i k-i+l ] 1




r* *} (n) /i x k « / t \i (m)% .L 4 Poi + <'-%>p = (t) po>
i-1 (m) r k-(i -1) -l
+ t St p _
2 ^(1 -qQ ) (1 -p ) J
=
'o* j(-)















(t) = E(t ° ) = 1
J
o
one can, in theory, compute
ty ,




Unfortunately, this computation becomes tedious for large m
values.
In matrix form, the vector of probability generating functions
t (n)





















) T = t n
(t)
is a probability generating function. (In fact, i|/ is the probability
generating function of the random variable denoting the state occupied







Remark. It is easy to incorporate into this consideration a slightly-
more general repair policy, as follows.
A type II mode is repaired with probability on a given trial,
given at least one such mode fails on that trial.
In this case, we replace the original one-step transition probability
matrix by one in which, for i = 0,l,...,k; n-1,2,...
p.. =P[A IE.
, ] + P[A & no repair I E. , ]
11 L n ' 1 , n - 1
L n ' l , n - 1 J
= q + (i - V pk ~* + (1 ' V (l ' pk_1) (1 " 0)
(i)
p v ' - PA & a repair ]
*i, i+ 1 L n




Of the three approaches to computing R discussed for the present
repair policy, it appears that none is clearly "best" under all
circumstances. A choice of which to use would probably depend, at
least in part, upon factors such as computer availability, size of the
matrix (p ) , and the number of R ' s to be computed. It is con-
*1J n
ceivable that, in some circumstances, the approach consisting of
(1)





Let us next consider the following repair policy: at each trial,
all type II modes that fail are repaired. In this case, the matrix
(1)
(p.. ' ) has elements such that
(1)




P C AJ E i
f
n-lJ = q + (1 " V*" I i=0,l,, .,k (11)
H) M „ , r'k ' i\ .k "i-J J i 0,1, k
i, i+j ^vCV)^' 1"^ 8 j1 :?:^::::..! ^
With this (p.. ) matrix, one could compute R using the spectral
ij n ° ^
decomposition approach discussed above. The generating function
approaches can also be used, although the computation becomes more
involved. This is because simple recurrence relations of the form (8)
under the former repair policy must now be replaced with relations of
the form
(n) (n - 1) (1) (n-1) (1) (n-1) {1}
P 0i " P i PH + P0,i-1 Pi-l,i + ••• + PC0 P i
Again, the "best" method to use to calculate R would probably depend
upon the particular circumstances involved.
An interesting modification of the repair policy in which all type II
failures at each stage are corrected is as follows.
At each stage, each observed type II failure is corrected with
probability
,
independent of other failures and the number of failures.
- 26

In this case, elements of (p.. ) are obtained by replacing q
with q in (10) , (11) , and (12) . This rather intuitively obvious state-









n - 1 J
• P f one type II mode failure I E. 1 +L r
I i, n - 1 d
k-i
+ (1 - ) P T k-i type II mode failures E.L r
I l , n-1 J




- 0) q }
J
]
q + ( i - q ) [ p + ( i - ) q ]
= q + (i - q ) [ i - 0q] k " '
p. . = P T one type II mode failure & one repair I E, ,]+'...




n - 1 J
+ P rk-i type II mode failures & one repair I E. 1L /c























d (U /n x ^ k-i-j /• k - x
{ (1 -0)q} J_1 ( -q)
(1 - qQ )




it follows that (13) is equivalent to
Pi
(
/i +1 ^ (i - qo )0q(k - i) [i ^q] 1
"" 1 " 1
Similarly, it follows that
i k-i
(1) _ s k - i -v k-i-mm
Pi ;i+j (1 -Vtt s . ( m > 1
m=j
• m (m - 1) . . . (m - j + 1) (1 - ) J
(1 ~ qQ
)
-jj- qJ (k - i) (k - i - 1) ... (k - i - j + 1




j /k-i\ k - i - j




") (1 " 0q)
for jl = 0, 1 , ... , k ; j = 1,2,..., k-i
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4. Model III: k Assignable Cause Modes, Not Necessarily Equally Lik'
Markov chain models for the case in which type II failures are not
equally likely are equivalent to models in which type II failures are
equally likely but the repair p'olicy does not treat the failure modes
"uniformly". In what follows, we shall concentrate mostly upon systems




One aspect of Model III which is different from the previous models
is the identification of "states" of the system. For example, suppose
k = 2
. We may define states as follows:
State Condition
no type II mode repaired
1 mode II repaired
2 mode II repaired
3 both type II modes repaired
- 29 -

In general, with k type II modes, there are 2 states of this nature.
(1)Once the corresponding (p.. ) matrix has been obtained, the value of
J










where the j component of the vector P is the conditional probability
that no type II failures occur, given the system is in state j and a
type I failure does not occur.
Let us assume that at each stage all type II failures are (permanently,
repaired, and consider two example models, each depending upon con-
ditions imposed on the occurrence of type II failures. Extensions to
other values of k and other repair policies can be made as in the
models considered previously. Consider first the case in which it is
assumed that II can fail on a given trial only if both II and I do not
fail. More precisely, assume that
P [ I fails ] = qQ
P [ II fails j no I failure ] - q
P T II„ fails I no I failure h. no II. failure] - q
u Z ' 1 c
P T IL, fails I I or II, fails] = P [ II. fails I I fails] =
2 ' 1 i
Under these "exclusive occurrence" assumptions, the one-step






















q + n (i - q )
(i - q ) q
x
(i)






Q ) d-q2 )
(1)
(
13 (1 " q ) q 2
(1)
'22 q + d-q ) (1-V
(1)
'23 d-q ) q 2
Note: This process can be viewed as a wa.lk on the plane or as a network,




Next, consider the case in which the type II modes are independent.
Let
P [ I fails ] = q
P [ II fails I no I failure] - q
P [ II fails I no I failure ] = q.
P [II fails & II fails I no 1 failure] = q q
assuming neither type II mode is repaired, In this case, the matrix
(1)




'01 = (1 -qQ ) (1 -q2 ) q x
(1)
'03 (1 V q i q 2
(The fact that p is no longer zero allows passage along the dotted










In both of these examples and, in general for other values of k,
the computation of (p.. ) in Model III can be accomplished using the
generating function approach or the spectral decomposition approach.
The probability generating function method no longer applies, however,




In viewing reliability growth prediction models as Markov chains,
it is seen that the computation of the reliability after n trials and
possible associated repairs, R , may be accomplished with any of
several different methods. A class of models is considered which
accommodates variations in several important factors such as the
interdependencies of assignable cause failure modes, inclusion of an
inherent failure mode, the repair policy, and the distribution of initial
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